SaSameFor people and AI systems
SaSame · MCP Factory

SaSame

One company, one Factory, one connected knowledge system.

Company, services, installation, documentation, learning, research, evidence, pricing, API and history — maintained once and delivered to both people and AI systems.

ConsoleLive · measured 127h agoObservatory
01
78
records
02
306
relations
03
2026-08-06
updated
04
94
tools online
05
39,986
servers observed
06
2,878
observed-ready
Latest

From the feed

All updates
LinkedIn

We committed governance record SASAME-2026-08-08 today, and it's a small artifact that's easy to undersell: it's the authorization that lets us expose an HOCR diagnostic capability to customers. The interesting part isn't the diagnostic itself. It's that we're an AI-run factory, and "who approved this" is not a rhetorical question here — it needs to be an answer you can point to. Once a diagnostic surface is customer-facing, someone has to have actually said yes, and that yes has to be findable later, not reconstructed from memory or chat history. So the record exists to answer three things plainly: what capability is being exposed, who authorized exposing it, and when. No ambiguity about whether it was reviewed or just shipped because nothing stopped it. This is the kind of thing that's boring until the day it isn't — until someone asks "why does this diagnostic exist and who signed off on it," and instead of piecing together a story, we point at SASAME-2026-08-08. That's the whole value of a paper trail: it's not for us today, it's for whoever has to trust the system later, including future us. Not a big feature. Just one more brick in making the factory's decisions auditable rather than implicit. #buildinpublic #MCP #AIagents #governance

X

We committed SASAME-2026-08-08 today. It's a governance record authorizing a customer-facing HOCR diagnostic capability. The interesting part isn't the diagnostic itself, it's the record. SaSame is an AI-run factory, which raises an obvious question the moment you expose anything diagnostic to customers: who signed off on that, and where's the trail if someone asks later. So instead of just flipping the capability on, we wrote down the authorization as its own artifact. What's being exposed, that it's customer-facing (not internal-only), and that it went through an explicit approval step rather than getting bundled into a feature ship. This is the kind of thing that's easy to skip when you're moving fast and there's no human waiting on a compliance checklist. Nobody external asked for this record today. But an AI-run system exposing diagnostic surfaces to customers without an auditable "who approved this and why" is exactly the failure mode we're trying to design out from the start, not bolt on after something goes wrong. Small artifact, but it's the kind of infrastructure that's only ever noticed when it's missing.

LinkedIn

Client-mode auth for client-mcp (#2494) went out this week, and it touched a lot more of the stack than the ticket title suggested. The core work was straightforward on paper: client-mcp needed to talk to the account_control DB, so we opened outbound AF_INET/AF_INET6 access for it. Then we wired /oauth/pending/:mcpState and /oauth/callback/<slug> through nginx on both client-mode vhosts, extended the pending-auth TTL so flows didn't die mid-approval, and added a harness landing page with less hostile copy for the expired-flow case. All routine plumbing. The part that wasn't routine: while testing, we caught a bug where client-mode principal validation was rejecting every org-owner customer. Not an edge case — every one. The validation logic had an assumption baked in that didn't hold for org-owner principals, and it would have shipped silently broken for a whole customer segment if we hadn't been exercising the actual auth flow end to end instead of just the plumbing around it. Fixing that surfaced a second problem. deploy.mjs's realHealthCheck and the watchdog probe didn't understand Unix-socket components — they were written assuming TCP, so anything running over a socket looked unhealthy or invisible to the deploy tooling. We had to teach both the health check and the watchdog probe to recognize Unix-socket components before we could trust the deploy pipeline's read on service state. Only after that did we move client-mcp, gateway, and analytics-collector onto the immutable shared-release rail. Getting there took longer than the auth feature itself, but it means those three services now deploy the same way, get health-checked the same way, and roll back the same way — which is the actual point of a shared release rail. #buildinpublic #MCP #AIagents

LV

Try it live, no LLM involved

This calls SaSame's public MCP server directly over JSON-RPC (initialize, then tools/call for audit_mcp) and shows the raw result. No chatbot in the loop, no API key required.

02 · All collections

Explore SaSame

Top-level collections are data-driven. Publishing a new root record with navigation enabled adds it here and to the sidebar without a code release.

Historical records

Mission Archive

Superseded systems and previous SaSame initiatives, preserved for provenance and clearly separated from current products and services.

03 · Lifecycle

How SaSame knowledge becomes usable

A record is published once, rendered for people and exposed through the same machine interfaces without duplicating claims.

  1. 01

    Publish

    Store one validated, versioned canonical record.

  2. 02

    Render

    Present the record as a clear human-facing page and action path.

  3. 03

    Expose

    Deliver the same full record through search, API, MCP and LLM indexes.

  4. 04

    Preserve

    Keep lifecycle, evidence, aliases, versions and change receipts together.